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ABSTRACT 26 
The seemingly stable construct of our bodily self depends on 27 
the continued, successful integration of multisensory feedback about 28 
our body, rather than its purely physical composition. Accordingly, 29 
pathological disruption of such neural processing is linked to striking 30 
alterations of the bodily self, ranging from limb misidentification to 31 
disownership, and even the desire to amputate a healthy limb. While 32 
previous embodiment research has relied on experimental setups 33 
using supernumerary limbs in variants of the Rubber Hand Illusion, 34 
we here used Mixed Reality to directly manipulate the feeling of 35 
ownership for one’s own, biological limb. Using a Head-Mounted 36 
Display, participants received visual feedback about their own arm, 37 
from an embodied first-person perspective. In a series of three 38 
studies, in independent cohorts, we altered embodiment by providing 39 
visuotactile feedback that could be synchronous (control condition) 40 
or asynchronous (400ms delay, Real Hand Illusion). During the 41 
illusion, participants reported a significant decrease in ownership of 42 
their own limb, along with a lowered sense of agency. Supporting 43 
the right-parietal body network, we found an increased illusion 44 
strength for the left upper limb as well as a modulation of the feeling 45 
of ownership during anodal transcranial direct current stimulation. 46 
Extending previous research, these findings demonstrate that a 47 
controlled, visuotactile conflict about one’s own limb can be used to 48 
directly and systematically modulate ownership – without a proxy. 49 
This not only corroborates the malleability of body representation 50 
but questions its permanence. These findings warrant further 51 
exploration of combined VR and neuromodulation therapies for 52 
disorders of the bodily self.   53 
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1. INTRODUCTION 68 
The foundations of our “selves”, and our understanding of who we are, are 69 
laid by the continuous and successful integration of multisensory information 70 
about our body. This interdependence between “mind” and body has occupied 71 
the thoughts of scholars time and again: from Descartes’ notion that the self 72 
cannot exist without the senses (Descartes and Cottingham, 2013), to Husserl 73 
positing that there is no possibility of distancing the self from the body or the 74 
body from the self (Husserl, 2002), to William James’ oft-cited claim that the 75 
body is “always there” (James, 1890). There is an overwhelming sense that 76 
the direct neural representation of our bodies, in harmony with our actual body 77 
composition, forms the basis of an infallible bodily self. However, clinical 78 
examples challenge this notion and have suggested that the body indeed can 79 
be experienced as lost, not under control, or not belonging (Brugger and 80 
Lenggenhager, 2014). This latter feeling of ownership is argued to be a key 81 
aspect of our sense of a bodily self (Blanke, 2012). Yet, while psychological 82 
and neuroscientific research has extensively investigated the fundaments of 83 
the feeling of ownership for a foreign body part, the loss of ownership has 84 
largely been neglected.  85 
Empirical insights into corporeal awareness stem to a large extent from 86 
experimental designs, which allow temporarily altering the sense of ownership 87 
through multisensory stimulation (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2007; 88 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Most famously, 89 
Botvinick and Cohen induced illusory ownership of an artificial hand by 90 
stroking a rubber hand placed in front of the participant in synchrony with the 91 
participant’s real hidden hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). This 92 
phenomenological experience of ownership over the rubber hand is 93 
accompanied by objectively-measurable changes in a broad variety of 94 
processes ranging from basic physiological mechanisms (e.g., body 95 
temperature (Macauda et al., 2015; Moseley et al., 2008), nociception (Hansel 96 
et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2014), cardiac signalling (Park et al., 2016), neural 97 
or skin response to threat (Ehrsson et al., 2007), and immunological responses 98 
(Barnsley et al., 2011)) up to high-level cognition (see e.g. (Maister et al., 99 
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2015) for a recent review). These data thus suggest that the bodily self is 100 
highly plastic and based upon momentary sensory integration.  101 
Next to advancing our understanding of the nature of bodily self-102 
consciousness and its disorders, such empirical evidence might contribute 103 
towards developing methods to restore the bodily self where it is disturbed 104 
(Moseley, 2007; Pazzaglia et al., 2016). Strikingly however, most studies 105 
using multisensory stimulation in healthy participants or patients targeted the 106 
manipulation to bodily ownership of an additional and external, fake or virtual 107 
body (part), someone else’s limb (Hohwy and Paton, 2010), or more recently, 108 
two virtual representations of one’s own limb (Newport and Preston, 2011; 109 
Ratcliffe and Newport, 2017). In the above-described rubber hand illusion 110 
(RHI), the most striking phenomenological perception is the feeling of 111 
ownership for the supernumerary rubber hand not the feeling of disownership 112 
for the real hand, which has generally been reported to be rather low (e.g. 113 
(Longo et al., 2008)). Furthermore, implicit measures of the illusion have 114 
shown to be predicted by the feeling of ownership for the rubber hand rather 115 
than by the feeling of disownership (Folegatti et al., 2009). In fact the two 116 
sensations are generally difficult to disentangle due to the nature of the RHI’s 117 
experimental design (Longo et al., 2008), and thus call for direct experimental 118 
manipulation of disownership (Folegatti et al., 2009).  119 
An experimental paradigm directly probing disownership is especially 120 
important from a clinical perspective. Body ownership disturbances after brain 121 
damage range from the feeling of one’s limb not being there (asomatognosia, 122 
cf. (Jenkinson et al., 2018)), to a sensation of disownership combined with 123 
feeling of hatred towards it (misoplegia, cf. (Loetscher et al., 2006)) or 124 
attribution of ownership to another person (Bottini et al., 2002), to the 125 
pathological embodiment of another person’s hand (cf. E+ patients (Garbarini 126 
et al., 2015)). The latter is phenomenologically closest to what participants 127 
report during the RHI. However, these cases are quite rare (Fossataro et al., 128 
2018), whereas the pure feeling of disownership (accordingly named E-) 129 
prevails after right hemispheric brain damage. This is also the case for various 130 
psychiatric conditions such as depersonalization syndrome, in which the own 131 
biological body often does not feel like belonging to the “self” anymore 132 
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(Sierra et al., 2005). Perhaps the purest sense of body disownership manifests 133 
in individuals suffering from xenomelia. These individuals feel like parts of 134 
their body do not belong to them (McGeoch et al., 2011) often resulting in 135 
extensive pretending behaviour (i.e. simulating their desired body state) and 136 
the desire for amputation (Brugger et al., 2013). Individuals with clinically 137 
altered body ownership for their biological body typically show enhanced 138 
illusory ownership in RHI-like setups (e.g. (Lenggenhager et al., 2015; Smit 139 
et al., 2018; van Stralen et al., 2013)) which might suggest a stronger influence 140 
of  online sensory information over longer term body representation. This 141 
further highlights the need for an experimental protocol to directly induce and 142 
measure disownership of the real body. Such paradigms are important to better 143 
understand and disentangle multisensory mechanisms underlying the broad 144 
range of clinically altered body ownership symptoms.  145 
We here describe a paradigm, the Real Hand Illusion (ReHI), designed to 146 
address this discrepancy between clinical reports and existing research 147 
paradigms in trying to alter the sense of ownership of one’s own biological 148 
limb in a Mixed Reality setup. During the illusion, participants view their own 149 
hand directly and from a first-person perspective through a head-mounted 150 
display (HMD) being touched either synchronously or asynchronously to the 151 
visual feedback (see Figure 1). The paradigm extends the study by Gentile and 152 
colleagues (Gentile et al., 2013), as it allows participants to view and move 153 
their own hands in the virtual space in real-time, eliminating the perception of 154 
viewing pre-recorded feedback. As the setup is fully automated possible 155 
confounds due to manual synchronization are precluded. The illusion was 156 
assessed, immediately after each condition, using a questionnaire adapted 157 
from the classical RHI questionnaire (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Longo et 158 
al., 2008). As synchronous visuotactile stimulation has repeatedly been shown 159 
to increase perceived ownership, we predicted continued ownership during 160 
synchronous stimulation and – more pertinent to the phenomenology 161 
described in clinical cases – decreased ownership of the own limb during 162 
asynchronous stimulation (Gentile et al., 2013). The latter could thus be 163 
regarded as temporarily mimicking the phenomenology found in 164 
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Somatoparaphrenia or Xenomelia patients, i.e. the feeling of estrangement for 165 
their own limb.  166 
Both Somatoparaphrenia and Xenomelia have been suggested to relate to 167 
alterations in multisensory bodily areas in the predominantly right-168 
hemispheric posterior parietal areas (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 2011; 169 
Rode et al., 1992) as well as structural and functional hyper-connectivity 170 
within the sensorimotor system (Hänggi et al., 2017). As a consequence, both 171 
syndromes predominantly affect the left side of the body. In a second study, 172 
we thus investigated whether the feeling of disownership could be evoked 173 
more easily on the left as compared to the right hand in healthy participants. 174 
Based on previous literature on the rubber hand illusion which suggests 175 
stronger illusion for the left hand (Ocklenburg et al., 2011), we hypothesized 176 
a stronger sensation of disownership during asynchronous stroking of the left 177 
as compared to the right hand.  178 
In line with the idea of a right posterior parietal involvement in disorders of 179 
body ownership, we further investigated whether neuromodulation of these 180 
parietal areas might alter the illusion in a systematic way. Brain imaging 181 
studies in individuals with Xenomelia have reported altered neural processes 182 
in the superior and inferior parietal lobe (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 183 
2011; Oddo-Sommerfeld et al., 2018) at least partly overlapping with the 184 
network described by Gentile and colleagues (2013). Limb misidentification 185 
due to right-hemispheric damage has also been associated with parietal areas 186 
(Antoniello and Gottesman, 2017; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). In line with this, 187 
neuromodulation through vestibular stimulation, which activates right parieto-188 
insular areas (Lopez et al., 2012), has been shown to be helpful in 189 
Somatoparaphrenia (Rode et al., 1992) and consecutively also suggested as a 190 
therapeutic approach for Xenomelia ((Ramachandran and McGeoch, 2007); 191 
but see also (Lenggenhager et al., 2014)). Similarly, left anodal galvanic 192 
vestibular stimulation has been used to manipulate bodily ownership in 193 
healthy participants in a rubber hand illusion setup (Lopez et al., 2010).  194 
In a further, exploratory study, we used transcranial brain stimulation rather 195 
than indirect peripheral stimulation to alter activation of right parietal areas. 196 
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We applied anodal and cathodal tDCS over the right superior parietal lobe 197 
normalised by a baseline sham stimulation. In line with previous literature we 198 
expected stimulation of right parietal networks to modulate body ownership.  199 
This hypothesis is further supported by two recent tDCS studies reporting a 200 
modulation of the drift measure of the RHI in case of anodal stimulation 201 
applied over the right temporo-parietal junction (and right pre-motor cortex 202 
(Convento et al., 2018) and a change in the onset time of the illusion, but not 203 
drift, during anodal stimulation over right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) 204 
respectively (Lira et al., 2018). These studies further reported significant, if 205 
slightly different, effects of anodal tDCS on perceived body ownership. 206 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 207 
2.1. Setup 208 
The technical setup follows the methods of our previous study (Bernal et al., 209 
2016) as described in the following. A MacBook Pro Retina by Apple (Apple 210 
Inc., Cupertino, CA, USA), was used to render the visual feedback. The laptop 211 
had a dedicated AMD Radeon R9 M370X graphics card. The Oculus Rift DK2 212 
(Subsidiary of Facebook, Menlo Park, CA, USA), Version 1.6 (SDK 0.5.0.1), 213 
was used to display the feedback. The HMD has a resolution of 214 
960x1080pixels per eye, a horizontal field of view of 100°, and a refresh rate 215 
of 60Hz. Head orientation but not translation was tracked, as participants were 216 
asked to keep their head stationary during each trial. A LeapMotion controller 217 
(Leap Motion, Inc. San Francisco, CA, USA, Software Version 2.3.1) 218 
recorded the participant’s hand as well as the paintbrush, used to provide 219 
tactile feedback, using the integrated infra-red (IR) cameras. The visual 220 
stimuli used the resulting IR pass-through feed so that participants would see 221 
their own hand, as opposed to a rigged 3D model (cf. supplemental figure 1). 222 
Finally, the Unity game engine (Unity Technologies, San Francisco, CA, USA 223 
Version 5.1.3f) was used to render the stimuli in an otherwise empty virtual 224 
space.  225 
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 226 
Figure 1 – A. Participants are seated at a desk with their right arm resting on a pillow at their 227 
side. They wear the Head-Mounted Display with attached IR camera. The video feed of the 228 
camera is used to display the image of the participant’s own hand in the HMD. B. The 229 
biological and augmented limbs are aligned so that participants see their own hand in the 230 
correct anatomical position. In the control condition the feedback accurately presents the 231 
experimenter’s hand and the paintbrush providing synchronous (matching) visuotactile 232 
feedback. C. In the experimental condition, a 400ms delay is introduced in the visual 233 
feedback. Participants therefore feel the touch of the paintbrush (light grey) before seeing the 234 
paintbrush in the corresponding position.  235 
2.2. Synchronous and Asynchronous Feedback 236 
In order to change the delay of the visual feedback between the synchronous 237 
and asynchronous conditions, a buffer of the IR-feed was implemented using 238 
Leap’s Controller object within Unity. This maintains a frame history buffer 239 
of 60 frames. At 120fps sampling of the LeapMotion cameras, this provides 240 
up to half a second delay. Here, a 40-frame delay was used in order to produce 241 
a ~400ms delay during asynchronous feedback. This includes the intrinsic 242 
latency of the equipment which is as follows: tracking camera frame rate 243 
(120fps, ~8ms), tracking algorithm (4ms), display refresh rate (60Hz, ~17ms), 244 
and GPU calculations (~17ms) totalling to an intrinsic system delay of ~46ms 245 
(Bernal et al., 2016). Feedback in the synchronous condition was therefore 246 
achieved in under 50ms. The (intrinsic) delay in the synchronous feedback 247 
condition was therefore well below the temporal mismatch threshold shown 248 
to interfere with visuotactile integration (300ms, Shimada et al., 2009), 249 
whereas it was well above this threshold in the asynchronous condition.  250 
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2.3. Tactile Feedback 251 
Tactile feedback was provided using an ordinary flat, short-haired paint brush 252 
(size 10). The experimenter stroked the dorsum of the participant’s hand and 253 
fingers in different positions and directions for a total of three minutes. Unlike 254 
in previous limb ownership studies, only the participant’s hand was stroked, 255 
as opposed to an additional rubber hand. Accordingly, the visuo-tactile 256 
conflict in the asynchronous condition is purely temporal, and the visuo-tactile 257 
feedback in the synchronous condition exactly matches the actual stimulation. 258 
It should be noted that the experimental condition of the RHI, synchronous 259 
feedback, is in this case the control condition, Figure 1B; the asynchronous 260 
visuotactile stimulation, the control condition in the RHI, becomes the 261 
experimental condition, Figure 1C.  262 
In studies 2 and 3, but not study 1, the three-minute illusion was preceded by 263 
one minute of synchronous, visual only, feedback. Here, participants were 264 
asked to move their hands in order to familiarise themselves with the 265 
environment, get accustomed to the feedback, and appreciate that they have 266 
full control of their own arm in the VR space.  267 
2.4. ReHI Questionnaire 268 
Following each experimental block, participants were asked to write down any 269 
comments they had about their perception of the illusion (open feedback). 270 
Phenomenological aspects of the illusion were then systematically assessed 271 
with a questionnaire adapted from the classical RHI questionnaire (Botvinick 272 
and Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008) using a banded visual analogue scale 273 
(Matejka et al., 2016). Questions one through six were scored positively from 274 
0 to 10, whereas questions seven through ten pertain to the feeling of 275 
disownership and were therefore reverse-coded for the analysis (0 -> 10, 1 -276 
>9, etc.). This was done so that all ten questions were combined to calculate 277 
an overall illusion-score with a possible range of 0 to 100. A score of 100 278 
represents the highest possible ‘embodiment score’, whereas a score of 0 279 
would reflect a complete loss of ownership and agency of the seen hand. 280 
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2.5. Participants 281 
Study 1 (N=20, age µ=21±1years, 12 female) investigated the illusion based 282 
on the individual questions and an overall score (see figure 2 for boxplots). A 283 
t-test comparing the illusion score between the two conditions of interest (i.e., 284 
synchronous versus asynchronous stroking) revealed a significant effect 285 
(t(19)=4.58, p<0.001, Cohen’s dz = 1.02) between conditions. This Cohen’s d 286 
was used for power calculations in studies 2 and 3. Participants for all three 287 
studies were right-handed (self-reported) and had normal or corrected to 288 
normal vision. 289 
A power calculation (G*Power (Faul et al., 2007)) indicated that a sample size 290 
of 15 would be required to detect an effect size of dz = 1.02, with the alpha 291 
level set at .05, with power of .95 (two-tailed). Twenty participants were 292 
recruited for study 2 (age: µ=21.55±2.48years, 10 females).  293 
Power calculation for the exploratory neurostimulation study was further 294 
informed by Kammers and colleagues effect size of approximately d = 0.6, 295 
reported in their rTMS study on the RHI (Kammers et al., 2010). Using a 296 
paired samples t-test to contrast two stimulation conditions, to reach 80% 297 
power with this effect size (alpha level = .05) would require 24 participants. 298 
Twenty-six participants (age µ=21.32±8.31years, 16 male) were recruited and 299 
completed the tDCS paradigm (study 3).  All participants refrained from 300 
consuming caffeine for at least three hours prior to the tDCS stimulation. All 301 
studies had been approved by the University of Central Lancashire’s Ethical 302 
committee (Protocol PSYSOC336).  303 
2.6. Transcranial direct current stimulation 304 
TDCS over the right superior parietal lobule (SPL) was used to change cortical 305 
excitability (see Figure 3). In one condition, anodal stimulation was applied 306 
over the right SPL with the aim of increasing cortical excitability, with the 307 
cathodal electrode as the reference. In another condition, cathodal stimulation 308 
was applied over the right SPL with the aim of decreasing cortical excitability. 309 
The third condition was the sham stimulation condition, which acted as a 310 
baseline against which to compare active stimulation. Participants attended 311 
two separate sessions, separated by at least three days. Participants always 312 
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completed the anodal and cathodal stimulation conditions in separate sessions, 313 
to avoid after-effects from one condition affecting another condition. Half the 314 
participants additionally completed the sham condition at the start of the first 315 
session, while the remaining half completed the sham condition at the start of 316 
the second session. The stimulation was applied double-blinded using pre-317 
determined codes stored on the tDCS equipment, which determined the type 318 
of stimulation applied (anodal, cathodal or sham) without the experimenter’s 319 
knowledge. 320 
The electrodes were positioned with the aid of an EASYCAP 21 EEG cap 321 
(EASYCAP, Herrsching), with the scalp electrode positioned over the P4 322 
region according to the international 10-20 system. The P4 electrode is located 323 
approximately over the right superior parietal lobe (Herwig et al., 2003) and 324 
has previously been used to target this region (Lira et al., 2018; Ono et al., 325 
2016). The reference electrode was positioned over the ipsilateral shoulder, 326 
held in place with a rubber strap (cf. Figure 3).  327 
In the two tDCS conditions, participants received 1200s (including 8s of fade-328 
in and 8s of fade-out) of tDCS, using a NeuroConn DC-Stimulator Plus 329 
(NeuroConn, Germany). A 1.5mA current was delivered through 25cm2 330 
saline-soaked sponges (0.9% NaCl solution), held in place on the participant’s 331 
scalp by rubber straps (current density of 0.06mA/cm2). Stimulation was 332 
applied for 600s before task onset, and continued 600s after task onset.   333 
Sham stimulation consisted of stimulation applied for 38s, before dropping to 334 
regular pulses of 115µA (lasting 3ms) every 550ms, which gives an average 335 
current strength of 0.002mA. This level of stimulation is far lower than 336 
required to cause changes in cortical excitability but allows monitoring of 337 
impedance (which could indicate poor electrode contact or disconnection). 338 
 339 
2.7. Analysis and Data Availability 340 
Paired frequentist and Bayesian t-tests were conducted in JASP (JASP Team, 341 
2018). These tests were two-tailed for NHST and directional for calculation 342 
of BF due to clear directional hypothesis of the illusion effect. Significance 343 
thresholds were set to p<.05 and BF>3 (BF<.3) respectively. NHST was used 344 
in combination with power-calculations; Bayesian statistics (Dienes, 2014) 345 
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are included as potential evidence in favour of the null. Cronbach’s alpha was 346 
calculated in R using R-Studio (R Development Core Team, 2017) and the 347 
Psych package (Revelle, 2017). All data are available to the readers via a 348 
public Open Science Framework project (http://osf.io/wbp59). 349 
  350 
Figure 2 – Questions and box plot with interquartile ranges of the results across the three studies (C-Control, I-Illusion) 351 
– Questions 1 through 6 were adapted from previous studies on the RHI. Question 4 is a control question and question 352 
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5 addresses participants’ sense of agency. Questions 7 through 10 were included to directly address disownership 353 
aspects of the ReHI. Participants in all three cohorts rated embodiment higher given synchronous visuotactile feedback 354 
about their upper limb in the control condition compared to the asynchronous feedback during the ReHI.  All asterisks 355 
indicate NHST significance. Data for S2 and S3 (sham stimulation) are taken from left hand.  356 
3. RESULTS 357 
As this is a novel experimental setup, we first set out to investigate the effects 358 
of the Real Hand Illusion on the phenomenology of the bodily self, focusing 359 
on hand ownership (Q1), location of touch (Q2-3), agency (Q5), and aspects 360 
of disownership (Q7-Q10). To compare the overall illusion across conditions, 361 
a combined score was created based on all questions; for this, disownership 362 
questions were reverse-coded, leading to a possible range of scores from 0 to 363 
100. 364 
3.1. Study 1 – Limb Disownership 365 
In study 1, twenty participants completed the synchronous and asynchronous 366 
feedback conditions and the ten-item questionnaire. Individual questions and 367 
results across all 3 studies are illustrated in Figure 2. As hypothesised, 368 
participants rated the questions significantly more positively in the control 369 
condition (77.53±13.08) than during the illusion (58.47±17.27, p<.001, 370 
BF=292.66) designed to induce a loss of ownership. 371 
To highlight a few key questions: participants rated the seen hand to feel less 372 
like their own during the illusion (Q1 control: 7.58±3.21 to illusion: 4.46±3.21 373 
(µ±σ), p=.002, BF=36.50); similarly, they reported that it felt less likely that 374 
the stroking they felt on their hand was due to the stroking on the seen hand 375 
(Q2: 7.06±3.44 to 4.16±3.46, p=.009, BF=10.96), and less likely that it was 376 
stroked in the same location (Q3: 8.87±1.47 to 3.85±3.51, p<.001, 377 
BF=2425.24). Participants also reported an effect of the ReHI on their 378 
(hypothetical) ability to move the seen hand (“feeling of agency” Q5: 379 
8.81±2.11 to 7.16±3.37, p=.021, BF=5.41). With respect to the disownership 380 
questions, participants reported that their hands felt less vivid than normal 381 
during the illusion (Q10: 6.83±2.88 to 5.15±2.95, p=.016, BF=6.89). 382 
Questions Q7-9 were not rated significantly differently between conditions in 383 
study 1 but may be worth further investigating as indicated by the inconclusive 384 
BF (all p>.085, all BF inconclusive .45<BF<.1.75).  385 
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3.2. Study 2 – Lateralisation 386 
In study 2, the lateralization of body representation and its malleability were 387 
investigated. It was hypothesised that the strength of the illusion would be 388 
higher for participants’ left hand compared to their right. A 2 x 2 repeated 389 
measures ANOVA, based on the overall illusion strength, confirmed our data 390 
from study 1 with respect to the main effect of the illusion. The total score 391 
significantly dropped from 83.95±13.10 during synchronous feedback to 392 
66.36±20.06 during the asynchronous feedback of the illusion (main effect of 393 
illusion F(1,19)=16.04, p<.001, η2=.46). There was no overall effect of 394 
laterality (p=.107); however, there was a significant interaction between the 395 
two factors (F(1,19)=5.84, p=.026, η2=.24): Questionnaire scores were lower 396 
for the left than the right hand during the illusion but not in the control 397 
condition. As hypothesised, the illusion was stronger for the left hand (paired 398 
t-test: µ-difference: 6.41±2.69, t(19)=2.38, p=.028) . The ANOVA results 399 
were corroborated in Bayesian t-tests. The data strongly support a main effect 400 
of illusion (C>I: BF=92.98) but not of lateralization (R≠L, BF=.78). The 401 
interaction, indicated by the left-right differences in both conditions, was also 402 
supported by the data (RI-LI > RC-LC: BF=4.61), resulting from the 403 
lateralisation difference during the illusion (LI < RI: BF=4.43). 404 
3.3. Study 3 – Neurostimulation 405 
In study 3, we set out to investigate the involvement of right parietal networks 406 
in maintaining body representation during the Real Hand Illusion. In two 407 
separate sessions, participants completed the ReHI while receiving sham, 408 
anodal, or cathodal tDCS stimulation, with the scalp electrode placed over the 409 
right superior parietal lobe. As this was an exploratory study, we were mainly 410 
interested in the overall effect of stimulation on ReHI score and the main 411 
contrast of anodal versus cathodal stimulation. In order to normalise the data, 412 
we therefore subtracted the average ReHI score during sham stimulation from 413 
anodal and cathodal scores. This resulted in a 2 x 2 repeated measures design 414 
with factors Illusion (synchronous, asynchronous) and Stimulation (anodal, 415 
cathodal). In-line with the studies 1 and 2, we report a significant main effect 416 
of the illusion in a third, independent participant pool (F(1,25)=25.54, p<.001, 417 
η2=.51, BFC>I=1474.21). We additionally observed a main effect of 418 
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Stimulation with ReHI scores being higher during cathodal stimulation than 419 
during anodal stimulation (F(1,25)=5.35, p=.029, η2=.18, BFC>A=3.81, 420 
BFC≠A=1.94, see Figure 3b), although there was no interaction between 421 
illusion condition and stimulation condition (F(1, 25) = 0.02, p = .89). 422 
3.4. Questionnaire Reliability 423 
As this is a novel paradigm accompanied by a newly designed questionnaire, 424 
we ran a reliability analysis across the three data sets (N=66) – once for the 425 
control condition, and once for the illusion condition. Cronbach’s alpha for 426 
the questionnaire responses in the control condition was αcontrol=0.79, in the 427 
illusion αillusion=0.85, indicating good internal consistency across the three 428 




Figure 3 Effects of Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation on ReHI Strength. A Electrodes were placed 433 
on the P4 position based of the international 10-20 system and the right shoulder. B The main contrast 434 
indicates that anodal stimulation over P4 significantly decreased embodiment across both conditions 435 
compared to cathodal stimulation. (Sham scores were subtracted for baseline correction.) C Breakdown 436 
of questionnaire scores across control and ReHI conditions and stimulation type. All boxplots indicate 437 
medians and Interquartile ranges; means are indicated by solid circles or diamonds (CC/CI = Cathodal 438 
Control/Illusion; SC/SI = Sham Control/Illusion; AC/AI = Anodal Control/Illusion). 439 
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 440 
4. DISCUSSION  441 
We here introduce a body-illusion that directly reduces the feeling of 442 
ownership over one’s biological limb without relying on feedback from a 443 
supernumerary proxy such as a rubber hand. Participants view their own arm, 444 
in Mixed Reality, from an embodied, first person perspective but receive 445 
feedback that contains a temporal, visuotactile conflict. In a series of three 446 
studies, in three separate participant pools, we demonstrate that the 447 
asynchronous feedback in the Real Hand Illusion causes participants to rate 448 
ownership (and the sense of agency) over their own hand and related 449 
sensations significantly lower than in the synchronous control condition. In 450 
addition, a number of participants independently reported a phenomenon akin 451 
to “pins and needles”, the tickling sensation that often occurs after transient 452 
paraesthesia.  453 
The Real Hand Illusion, which could be considered as an inverse of the 454 
classical rubber hand illusion, hence modulates body ownership by 455 
introducing a controlled mismatch into bottom-up multisensory integration. 456 
Our data suggest that this weakened embodiment is pronounced for the left 457 
hand, supporting the right hemispheric dominance hypothesis of body 458 
representation as reflected in neuropsychological case reports and previous 459 
ownership illusion studies in healthy participants. Transcranial direct current 460 
stimulation over the right superior lobule modulated the overall strength of 461 
limb ownership, corroborating the role of right posterior parietal networks for 462 
multisensory representations of the body and self.    463 
4.1. Phenomenology 464 
Embodiment, ownership, and the sense of agency have been argued to be 465 
matters of “a very thin phenomenal awareness” (Gallagher, 2007) and to only 466 
form the “background of mental life” (Longo et al., 2008). Often, we only 467 
fully become aware of these processes when they break down – which can 468 
have severe consequences (see e.g. Ananthaswamy, 2016; Sacks, 1998). 469 
While research into the sense of agency has managed to address this by 470 
experimentally modulating a loss of control (Franck et al., 2001; Kannape and 471 
Blanke, 2013; Leube et al., 2003a, 2003b; Nielsen, 1963; Wegner, 2002), a 472 
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symptom that is often evident in clinical conditions (see e.g. Blakemore et al., 473 
2002), ownership studies have instead investigated the opposite: a ‘positive’ 474 
ownership of an artificial limb such as a rubber hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 475 
1998) or rubber foot (Lenggenhager et al., 2015), someone else’s filmed arm 476 
(Hohwy and Paton, 2010) or even two versions of one’s own hand (Ratcliffe 477 
and Newport, 2017) in-line with the E+ but not E- patients described in the 478 
introduction (Garbarini et al., 2015). Analog to sensorimotor studies 479 
delineating the spatiotemporal limits of agency, we have here introduced a 480 
paradigm to directly induce disownership of one’s own limb: where 481 
participants report a loss of control over their actions in agency research, 482 
participants in the ReHI perceive a significantly weakened ownership over 483 
their own hand and arm, along with the spontaneously reported sensation of 484 
pins and needles.  485 
The topic of disownership is a somewhat contentious area with respect to the 486 
RHI. There is a general consensus that the rubber hand is embodied during 487 
synchronous feedback (see e.g. Serino et al., 2013) – arguably only into the 488 
body image (for perception) but not the body schema (for action) (Kammers 489 
et al., 2009). However, this does not automatically imply that one’s own limb 490 
is simultaneously disembodied. While arguments have been made for some 491 
disownership and deafferentation, either by asking directly about 492 
disownership of the real hand (Preston, 2013) or by inferring from 493 
physiological data (drop in skin temperature (Moseley et al., 2008; Salomon 494 
et al., 2013) or alterations in immune response (Barnsley et al., 2011), but see 495 
(de Haan et al., 2017) for a critical account), evidence suggests that multiple 496 
representations of the hand might co-exist (Ehrsson, 2009; McGonigle et al., 497 
2002) severely limiting the argument made in previous RHI-type studies. This 498 
also corresponds to the results and interpretation of Lane and colleagues 499 
(2017) who specifically targeted limb disownership during the RHI: 500 
disownership for the biological limb is less robust than ownership for the 501 
rubber hand, as attention is primarily directed at the latter. Ultimately, the 502 
strongest statement to be made in favour of disembodiment from these 503 
previous paradigms is that the supernumerary hand replaces or “functionally 504 
suppresses” the participant’s actual hand (Longo et al., 2008).  505 
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Another important argument raised by Longo and colleagues in their 506 
psychometric approach to the RHI is that the asynchronous condition cannot 507 
be reduced to a mere control condition. Sensations grouped under the umbrella 508 
term “deafference”, only occur in the asynchronous condition (and still rely 509 
on a weak embodiment of the rubber hand). The ReHI illusion targets exactly 510 
these aspects of body disownership but based on the (strongly embodied) 511 
biological limb of the participant. Sensations such as “numbness” and “pins 512 
and needles”, included as direct questions in both conditions in Longo et al., 513 
were spontaneously reported by the participants in all three cohorts of the 514 
ReHI – and only in the asynchronous and in this case illusion condition. 515 
Further, the feeling of disownership and deafferentation are both enhanced 516 
during asynchronous stroking.  517 
In summary, the phenomenology of the ReHI extends previous findings as it 518 
precludes both supernumerary embodiment and the replacement of the actual 519 
limb representation. There is only one arm. Rather than being indicative of a 520 
malleability to multisensory body illusions or an ability to incorporate 521 
supernumerary limbs, the current findings hence suggest that limb 522 
representation can directly be attenuated and phenomenologically 523 
deafferented, without “tricking the brain” by including a proxy. It is therefore 524 
not so much illustrating the malleability of limb representation but questions 525 
its actual permanence: contradicting William James famous premise (James, 526 
1890), the body may not always be there. 527 
4.2. Handedness and Lateralisation  528 
Study 2 illustrates that the phenomenological experience of the ReHI was 529 
stronger for the left hand as opposed to the right. This difference in 530 
lateralisation was specific to the illusion condition as no lateralisation was 531 
observed in the control condition. The findings are in line with mounting 532 
evidence that Xenomelia, similar to Somatoparaphrenia, more often than not 533 
affects the left side of the body (Brugger and Lenggenhager, 2014; McGeoch 534 
et al., 2011). While an argument is to be made that lateralisation may be a 535 
result of handedness, and stronger bodily illusions have been reported for the 536 
non-dominant hand (Brugger and Meier, 2015), evidence from the RHI 537 
suggests there is a right-hemispheric dominance for sense of body ownership 538 
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independent of handedness ((Ocklenburg et al., 2011), but also see (Smit et 539 
al., 2017)). Taken together, this suggests that the ReHI is mediated by 540 
multisensory bodily areas in right-hemispheric posterior parietal areas (Hilti 541 
et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 2011; Rode et al., 1992), further motivating the 542 
exploratory neurostimulation study to focus on the left upper-limb.  543 
4.3. Neurostimulation modulates Limb Disownership  544 
The results from Study 3 indicated that application of tDCS over the right SPL 545 
modulated the experience of ownership, dependent on the polarity of 546 
stimulation. Specifically, anodal stimulation led to reduced feelings of 547 
ownership over the limb, while cathodal stimulation increased feelings of 548 
ownership. It should be noted that this was an exploratory study, aiming to 549 
link the ReHI to activity in the parietal cortex; future studies should therefore 550 
aim to test under which conditions the effect of stimulation holds. Our data 551 
suggest that transcranial stimulation affected the experience of ownership 552 
during both the illusion and control conditions, suggestive of a broad effect of 553 
stimulation that is not dependent on synchronous visuotactile feedback. This 554 
is in line with two recent neurostimulation studies reporting mainly non-555 
illusion-specific effects of anodal stimulation over right PPC ( Convento et 556 
al., 2018; Lira et al., 2018).  557 
An open question remains as to the exact mechanisms affected by 558 
neurostimulation. Convento and colleagues (2018) report the strongest effect 559 
of stimulation on the drift measure rather than the subjective strength of the 560 
illusion, whereas Lira and colleagues (2018) report a stimulation-dependent 561 
change in illusion-onset times. In the latter study, the authors argue that the 562 
observed differences may be due to generally enhanced multisensory 563 
processing; in the former, the authors further discuss the involvement of body-564 
specific sensory integration (see also (Tsakiris et al., 2008)). What both of 565 
these previous studies have in common, however, is that anodal stimulation of 566 
the parietal lobe led to increased efficacy of the illusion (i.e. faster time to 567 
illusion onset, or proprioceptive drift) – that is, participants perceived more 568 
ownership over the rubber hand – whereas, in the present study, a similar 569 
stimulation paradigm resulted in participants perceiving less ownership over 570 
their own arm. Although these results may seem somewhat contradictory, they 571 
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can be reconciled if we assume the effect of stimulation in both the RHI and 572 
ReHI is relevant to inducing disownership over one’s own limb. The 573 
underlying mechanism of this effect could on the one hand relate to a localized 574 
change in multisensory processing (Lira et al., 2018), body-specific 575 
integration (Convento et al., 2018; Tsakiris et al., 2008), or a re-weighting of 576 
sensory information over body-representation in the parietal lobe, or on the 577 
other hand a change in functionally connected regions such as the primary or 578 
secondary somatosensory cortex (Hänggi et al., 2017), where structural and 579 
functional hyper-connectivity have been reported in individuals with 580 
Xenomelia. This explanation is necessarily speculative but could further be 581 
investigated using neuroimaging alongside the ReHI paradigm.  582 
From a clinical perspective, it is further of interest that previous studies have 583 
shown that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied to the right 584 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) disrupts the rubber hand illusion for body-like 585 
objects (but not other objects, cf. Tsakiris et al., 2008). Clinically, low-586 
frequency repetitive TMS applied to the TPJ may decrease the frequency of 587 
auditory hallucinations in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, a 588 
symptom frequently linked to loss of agency or ownership over self-generated 589 
speech (Moseley et al., 2013; Slotema et al., 2014). Taken together, these 590 
findings suggest that non-invasive neurostimulation is capable of affecting the 591 
perception of bodily ownership and support the therapeutic potential of 592 
neurostimulation in disorders of bodily ownership. 593 
4.4. ReHI Considerations 594 
In contrast to the on-going, artificially synchronised visuotactile feedback 595 
required by the RHI, the ReHI relies on exploiting the same bottom-up 596 
multisensory integration processes by introducing a temporal mismatch to 597 
disrupt body ownership. In addition to the aforementioned conceptual 598 
advantages, this has a number of practical advantages. One, the sensation of 599 
the mismatch is immediate. Unlike the RHI, which relies on continued 600 
synchronous feedback from two distinct, visuotactile sources and has reported 601 
onset times between 10-50 seconds (Ehrsson, 2004; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 602 
2017) the ReHI relies on a hard-coded temporal mismatch from a single 603 
source. Two, the multisensory mismatch is unresolvable, making the illusion 604 
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very stable. Participants feel the touch on the back of their hand before 605 
receiving visual feedback. As the position of the subsequent touch-location is 606 
unpredictable, there cannot be an adaptation to the conflicting sensory 607 
information. Three, the mismatch is purely temporal. Whereas inadvertent 608 
spatiotemporal incongruencies occur in both synchronous and asynchronous 609 
conditions in the RHI (and to a lesser extent in Gentile et al., 2013), only a 610 
single hand is stimulated in the ReHI. Four, and continuing this point, the 611 
control condition is very accurate, as the perceived location of the touch 612 
exactly corresponds to the seen location. The technical setup precludes an 613 
unwanted (spatial) mismatch, apart from the intrinsic (temporal) delay.  614 
While previous (Mixed Reality) studies mainly used RHI-type setups 615 
(IJsselsteijn et al., 2006; Shimada et al., 2009) and thus still relied on an albeit 616 
virtual proxy, some have used similar visual feedback based on the 617 
participant’s own body (Suzuki et al., 2013), or overlapped feedback from a 618 
virtual or someone else’s real hand over the participant’s hand (Hohwy and 619 
Paton, 2010; Yuan and Steed, 2010). However, these studies only matched 620 
individual aspects of the current setup but differed with respect to at least one 621 
of the four constraints for the (body-) integration of multisensory signals 622 
described by Blanke and colleagues (2015): correct proprioceptive (1) and  623 
body-related visual information (2), adherence to peripersonal space (3), and 624 
continued congruence of multisensory feedback (4). Our setup further extends 625 
the setup used by Gentile and colleagues (2013) as it allows for real-time 626 
manipulation.  Finally, the setup is portable and easily implemented, making 627 
it a promising tool for clinical studies and potential outpatient treatment. The 628 
paradigm relies on a simple (video) buffer, making it adaptable to a range of 629 
mobile devices and commercially available research platforms. 630 
4.5. Limitations and Future Directions 631 
There are still a number of open questions to address. For example, we based 632 
our questionnaire on widely used RHI items but included four new questions 633 
directly addressing limb disownership (Q7-10), extending the questionnaire 634 
used in (Gentile et al., 2013). A follow-up study that investigates an expanded 635 
questionnaire using principal component analysis, similar to the approach 636 
taken by Longo and colleagues (Longo et al., 2008) may be able to improve 637 
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the reporting of the phenomenology of the ReHI. Linking back to the “pins 638 
and needles” sensation spontaneously reported by participants, physiological 639 
reactions to the illusion should be investigated. Gentile and colleagues (2013) 640 
have illustrated changes in galvanic skin conductance depending on the 641 
disembodiment of the shown hand. Further studies may follow previous 642 
protocols on the RHI to investigate body temperature (Macauda et al., 2015; 643 
Moseley et al., 2008), nociception (Hansel et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2014), 644 
cardiac signalling (Park et al., 2016), and immunological responses (Barnsley 645 
et al., 2011)) up to high-level cognition (Maister et al., 2015).  646 
A further line of inquiry should address the clinical aspects of limb 647 
disownership by working with patient populations. For example, individuals 648 
with Xenomelia show an enhanced response for the affected limb in a rubber 649 
hand illusion type of setup (Lenggenhager et al., 2015). Does the same hold 650 
true for the ReHI and how does its phenomenology compare to the sensation 651 
of “over-completeness” described by these individuals? Does it capture 652 
aspects of loss of limb ownership experienced in Somatoparaphrenia 653 
analogous to the RHI in E+ patients (Garbarini et al., 2015)? Applying the 654 
ReHI in individuals with Xenomelia may recreate the reported feeling of 655 
disownership – or, by inducing disownership over an unwanted limb – create 656 
a cessation in the dysphoric feeling of over-completeness. Similar to the 657 
pretending behaviour exercised by these individuals (First, 2005; L. Fischer, 658 
2015), this may offer a temporary relief, if not a treatment. Research with such 659 
a cohort will further be relevant to understanding the permanence of body 660 
representation. If the loss of ownership is a gradual process, it could 661 
potentially be tracked longitudinally using the ReHI and further related to the 662 
frequency and duration of pretend behaviour over time. The exploratory tDCS 663 
results further merit investigation of neurostimulation as a therapeutic 664 
possibility (although this may evoke ethical questions pertaining to the 665 
identity of individuals with Xenomelia). Finally, applying an analogue 666 
paradigm to the full body (Blanke et al., 2015) may provide an experimental 667 
link to investigating aspects of depersonalisation in the general population 668 
(Sierra and David, 2011). 669 
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5. CONCLUSION 670 
The Real Hand Illusion introduced here offers a direct way of modulating limb 671 
ownership in healthy individuals. It does so without relying on a proxy, but by 672 
introducing a temporal, visuotactile mismatch into bottom-up processed 673 
feedback about one’s own limb in Mixed Reality. These findings are 674 
corroborated by two additional studies in independent participant pools 675 
linking the illusion to right posterior parietal networks for multisensory 676 
representations of the body and self. By directly investigating the loss of 677 
ownership of one’s own limb, analogue to research into the sense of agency, 678 
the Real Hand Illusion opens up the possibility of more adequately addressing 679 
the majority of clinical cases of altered body ownership; further, it provides a 680 
novel method of investigating body representation and its permanence in 681 
healthy individuals. 682 
 683 
 684 
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 685 
 686 
 687 
Supplemental Figure 1 Visual Feedback during the ReHI. A. Participants viewed an Infra-Red feed of their own hands, from 688 
a first-person perspective, in an otherwise empty virtual environment (cropped from left eye view). Before either condition, 689 
participants were provided with real-time feedback and asked to move their hands around the virtual space. B. During the 690 
control condition (real-time) and the ReHI condition (400ms visual delay), participants received visuo-tactile stimulation via 691 
a simple paintbrush. Perceiving temporally conflicting information about their own limb, led participants to report a loss of 692 
ownership of their own limb, compared to the control condition.  693 
 694 
  695 
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